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Summary findings
In the current period of "devaluation  pessimism,"  depreciation  twice  as large as that in intlationary
devaluation  is often seen as an instrument  to  economies.  In low-inflation  countries,  a 50-percent
accommodate  inflation  instead of one to change  the  devaluation  typically  succeeds  in depreciating  the real
real exchange  rate and support external balance.  exchange  rate by about 30 percent in the long run,
Kiguel  and Ghei argue that such pessimism  has in some  without leading  to a permanent  increase  in inflation.
cases  gone too far.  The authors also find that growth and exports increase
The real exchange  rate is an endogenous  variable,  after devaluation.  Other findings:
and whether devaluation  can change  the real exchange  * Countries  determined  to maintain  price stabiliLy
rate depends  on other factors.  But devaluation  is not  after devaluation  can do so.
always  evil, say Kigue!  anl Ghei, and in some  cases  it  * In countries  with low  inflation that have  not
can improve  macroeconomic  performance.  It is most  devalued  for three years,  a maxi-devaluation  is not
effective  if it corrects  an initial situation  where  the  likely  to move  the economy  into high inflation.  Under
currency  is clearly  overvalued.  In low-inflation  most of the "most likely"  scenarios,  inflation  will
countries,  devaluation  is less  likely  to destabilize  prices  increase  around  3 percentage  points (or 35 percent of
because  there is less  indexing.  the original  rate of inflation).  Under the "best"
Kiguel  and Ghei examine the effect  of maxi-  scenarios,  there is an increase  in inflation the year
devaluation  in low-inflation  countries  on the real  before  and the year of devaluation,  but inflation  then
exchange  rate, inflation,  and growth. They use  a  falls  to a level  slightly  higher tha'l the level  before
sa-nple  of 33 maxi-devaluations  (20 percent or larger)  devaluation.
in economies  that had low inflation  before the  *  Devaluation  has a favorable  impact  on exports.
devaluation  and where the exchange  rate had  *  The shift to a more flexible  exchange-rate  regime
remained  fixed for at least three years before  the  was not associated  with complete  loss of control of
devaluation.  Not surprisingly,  most of these  episodes  inflation.  In most cases,  inflation  went up slightly  -
occurred  in the 1950s  and 1960s,  when fixed  and in only  a few  cases  (Ecuador,  Israel, Mexico,  and
exchange  rates and inflation were the norm.  Zaire)  dramatically.  But the movement  toward greater
The results  indicate  room for devaluation  optimirm.  exchange-rate  flexibility  was not associated  with
The authors find tnat deval:ation is more effective  in  complete  loss of control of inflation. In Pakistan  and
low-inflation  economies  where devaluation  is a  Rwanda,  inflation  fell, and in most countries  it
sporadic event  - typically, effecting  a real  averaged  less  than 20 percent.
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The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of
the World Bank or its affiliated institutions.  We are grateful to Larry
Hinkle, Larry Summers and Michael Walton for comments on an earlier draft.I. Are Devaluations Effective in Changing the Real Exchange Rate?
We live in a period characterized by devaluation pessimism.  As the
world became more tolerant of inflation, following the collapse of the Bretton
Woods era, inflation rates have been higher, and maxi-devaluations have been
more frequently eroded by increases in domestic prices.  Devaluations are now
seen more often as an instrument to accommodate inflation instead of one that
can be effective in changing the real exchange rate and support external
balance.  Recent empirical work on this topic by Kamin  (1988)  and Edwards
(1989)  by and large support this view.  But is this skepticism about
devaluations right?  Has it always been this way?
in this paper we will argue that the new pessimism has gone too far, and
that in fact there are numerous cases in which devaluations did, and will
continue to work.  We recognize that the real exchange rate 1S,  an endogenous
variable, and that the effectiveness of devaluations to change the real
exchange rate depends on other things.  However, devaluations are not always
evil, and that there are cases in which they can improve macroeconomic
performance. Besides, in low inflation economies devaluations are less likely
to destabilize prices because there is less indexation.  Krugmar.  (1991), in  a
recent illuminating paper shows that during the period of flexible exchange
rates in the United States, movements in the real exchange rate have followed,
almost one to one, changes in the nominal exchange rate (as shown in figure
l.a).  Inflation did not increase in response to the nominal depreciations.
Likewise, Malaysia is a good example of a low inflation developing country
where movements in the real effective exchange rate mimic changes in the
nominal rate.  In addition, there are many examples ofFIGURE  1
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successful maxi-devaluations in ceveloping countries during the years of the
Bretton Woods system, such those of the Philippines in 1962, Venezuela in 1964
and India in 1966.  In these episodes devaluations were effective in changing
the real exchange rate without leading to a permanent increase in inflation.
What explains the difference in the effectivenes.s  of devalHations?
Part of the difference lies in the fact that a real depreciation was
probably needed in these episodes.  Real depreciations are required to deal
with deteriorations in terms of trade, and are likely to result from a
reduction in the budget deficit.  The difference in outcome also lies in the
longer term commitment to the fixed excharge rate system and low inflation.
In this paper we examine the effect of maxi-devaluations on basic
macroeconomic variables such as the real exchange rate, inflation, gr,.dth,
etc.  We use a restricted sample of 33 maxi-devaluations  (20*  or larger) in
economies that had low inflation prior to the devaluation.  In addition, in
order to concentrate on episodes in which devaluations were an infrequent
event, we imposed the constraint that the exchange rate had remained fixed for
at least three years before the devaluation.  Not surprisingly, most of these
episodes occurred in the fifties and sixties, when fixed exchange rates and
the inflation were the norm.  We analyze the outcomes of these episodes using
a methodology similar to Kamin.
Our results indicate that there is room for devaluation optimism.  We
find that devaluations are much more effective in low inflation economies
where devaluations are a sporadic event, typically, they succeed in effecting
a real depreciati,n which is twice as large as in inflationary economies.  In
low inflation economies, a 50% devaluation typically succeeds in depreciating
the real exchange rate by about 35% in the longer term, wiLhout leading to a
permanent increase in inflation.  In addition, we find that growth and exports4
increase after the devaluation, a result also found in previous studies.
The remainder of  this paper will bfc  organized as follows.  We first
present in more detail the evolution of some key racroeconomic variables after
the devaluation.  We compare our findings with those obtained for the broader
sample of high and low inflation economies.  In the ne%c section we briefly
trace the evolution of macroeconomic variables in these countries once they
moved away from the fixed exchange rate.  The purpose of this exercise is to
examine whether the movement to exchange rate flexibility (usually through the
adoption of a crawling peg) was associated with a permanent increase in
inflation and worse overall macroeconomic performance.  The experience in this
area appears to be mixed, and not surprisingly, much depends on the way the
policy makers manage basic macroeconomic policies, and how much commitment
they had to the fixed exchange rate.  We conclude with some reflections on the
empirical findings presented in this paper.
II. The Experience With Devaluations in Low Inflation Economi=s
1. Sample of Devaluations
We consider two groups.  Group A consists of thirty three maxi-
devaluation episodes between 1950 and 1990, most of them in developing
countr-ies  (see  table 1)  . In all cases the nominal devaluation was 20 percent
or larger.  Thirty one devaluations were within the 20 to 140 percent range,
with two outliers with 200 percent devaluations.  We restricted the sample to
low inflation economies  (rates  of inflation below 10%) which had not devalued
three years prior and three years after tne devaluation episode that we
consider.  This  allow,  us  to  concen:rate on episodes where one time
I  The exceptions are France and Finland, two industrialized countries.5
devaluations can be perceived as such, and have a good chance of having a
lasting impact on the real exchange rate.  In most of the cases though, no
other devaluation took place over a seven -ear  period.  In some instances,
e.g. Greece  (1953),  and Verezuela  (1964),  among others, the exchange rate
remained fixed foL over two decades.
The second group, group B, includes in addition to all the episodes
presented in ,.oup A episodes in which there was another devaluation or a
change to a crawling peg regime within three years of the initial devaluation.
We evaluate the effectiveness of the devaluation by compJ.ring  the
evolution of key macroeconomic variab!es before and after-  it.  In particular,
we look at the extent to which the devaluation succeeded in changing the real
exchange rate in the longer term, and whether it had any permanent effects on
inflation, growth, export performance and on the holding o:-  inte,national
reserves.
2. The Received Wisa.m
We use Kamin (1988)  study as the benchmark.  His results are based on a
sample of 50 to 90 (depending  on iata  availability for different variables)
devaluation episodes effected between 1953 and 1983.  The minimum size of the
devaluation was 15 percent.  The methodology in that paper was to trace the
evolution of some selected variables for seven years; the year of the
devaluation  (time T), three years before and three years after.  Kamin
explains the methodology in this way:  "The  value of the indicator for each
year was then averaged  (unweighted)  with the corresponding values for every
other devaluation episode in the sample.  The result is the average, or
stylized, time profile for that indicator  over the course of the typical
devaluation episode.  In aggregating across episodes, both mean and median6
averages were calculated."  (p.7)
We can summarize the findings of his study as follows:  i. devaluations
on average had a small impact on the real exchange rate in longer terrn  (i.e.
after three years), with an average real depreciation between T and T-3 of 12%
and a median of 9%; ii. inflation clearly increases relative to the rate
prevailing three years prior to the devaluation von  average, by 10 percentage
points, or 60% of the rate of inflation prevailing at T-3)  ,  the average
increase is smaller wher comparing T and T-3; iii. devaluqtions have a
favorable impact on growth in the short term, there is an expansion relative
to the year prior to the devaluation  (devaluations  thus appear to be
expansionary in the short run).  In the longer term, however the evidence is
mixed.  On the external accounts, export oerformance improves, but the
strongest finding are for the first two years after tne devaluations,  the
longer term effects are mixed.  He also finds that there is some improvement
in the trade balance immediately following the devaluation.  This effect,
however, is reversed and by the third year.  Not surprisingly, he finds that
reserves improve.
How likely are countrius to be in group A or B?  Based on the sample
that we have, there is a 30% percent probability that a country that devalues
once, will either effect another devaluation or move to a crawling peg within
three years.  This means that in most cases, countries that are determined to
maintain price stability after the devaluation can succeed in doing so.TABIL l(a)
MAXIDEVA'.UATION  EPISODES
Oow  inflatlon  only)
Ecuador  19120.0CI  9
Tunisis  1957  20.00  7
Now  Zeahnd  1967  23.36  6
Tuniisia  1964  23.81  11
Egypt  1962  23.91  17
Sri  Lanka  1967  24.15  5
costd Rlica  1974  28.87  7
Peru  1958/59  28.89  9
F!nland  1967  30.43  9
Nepal  1967  32.94  8
Colombia  1962  34.33  3
France  1957/58  36.81  11
enezuela  1964  38,20  20
Ecuador  I  1970  38.89  12
Finland  1957  38.96  10
Pakistan  1S55  43.17  18
Peru  1967  44.30  8
Mexico  1954  44.51  22
ririidad  &  Tobago  1985  50.00  3
i  India  19ie  58.66  8
!Syria  1954  63.47  8
Israel  1962  66.67  5
Burundi  1965  75.00  11
Egypt  1979  78.89  10
Jamaica  1978  86.45  5
Philippines  1962  94.06  8
Greece  1953  100.00  22
Rwanda  1966  100.00  8
Pakistan  1972  130.15  10
Colombia  1957/58  134.11  4
l  ran  1955  134.88  26
lZaire  1967  203.03  9
I  srael  1953/54  257.78  8
Notes
Exchange  rate  is  defined  as local  currency/US  $
Next  devauation:  number  of  years  unitl  the next  devaluation
No number  for a rnaxi-devaluation  accompanying  a CERRTABLE  1  (b)
ALL MAXIDEVALUATION  SPISOCES
_  ~~~~~~noludn  t  Nwo aocmon:  a Ct  ERFR.
kiLanka  1975  15.24  .
euldor  ~~~~  ~  ~~~1961  20.W  9
unMe  1SS7  20.00  7
uwl  ~~~~  ~  ~~~~~1971  20.00  3
unisa  1981  23.18
Z"kuid  1967  23.38  6
unbb  1964  23.81  11
gYPt  1962  23.91  17
Lanka  1967  24.15  5
RIoa  1974  28.87  7
1958/59  28.89  9
1982  29.70
nland  1967  30.43  9
rurundl  1983  30.48
1982  32.60
;rePS)  1967  32.94  8
Bolombia  1962  34.33  3
1957/58  36.81  11
1964  38.20  20
tcuador  1970  38.F8  12
ninland  1957  38.96  10
1974  42.86
|takbtan  1955  40.17  18
p  ru  1967  44.30  8
1954  A4.51  22
nnldad&Tobago  1985  50.00  3
philipp'nes  1981  52.68
Dndis  1966  58.66  8
pyria  1954  63.47  8
philippines  1970  63.74  11
psrael  1962  66.67  5
IPsnJ  1975-76  70.44
hnezueha  1984  74.42
E3urundl  1965  75.00  11
g9ypt  1979  78.89  10
Jamica  1983  84.00
Jamalca.  1978  66.45  5
philippinee  1962  94.06  8
1 :3reece  1953  100.00  22
1966  100.00  8
Pakistan  1972  130.15  10
tolombia  1957/58  134.11  4
ran  11955  134.88  26
krgentina  1955  158.23
Zaire  1967  203.03  9
srad  1953/54  257.78  8
posh  Rlea  1981  321.12
change  rate  is  defined  as loca currency/US  $
ext devauation:  number  of yeaus  unit the  next  devaluaton
number  for a ma,d-devaluation  accompanying  a CERR9
3. The Impact of Devaluations
3.a the Real Exchange Rate
The first question that we address is how effective are devaluations in
changing the real excloange  rate in low inflation economies 2. ihe evolution of
the mean and mediar of this variable for 33 devaluation episodes incl ded
gzoup A  is shown in table 2.a.  This sample is restricted to countries that
did not devalue three years before and three years after the devaluatior.. In
the typical episode the real exchange rate appreciates prior to the
devaluation and then depreciates.  On average devaluations were an effective
instrument for changing the real exchange rate, as they succeeded in effecting
a 32% real depreciation between T-l and T+3.  Our results .. ndicate  t'at
devaluations are more powerful instruments for changing the real exchange rate
than the works of Kamin (1988)  or Edwards (1989)  3uggest.  Their works
indicate that durinig  the same time span devaluations changed the real exchange
rate between 10 and 14*.
The main reason for the difference is that we concentrate on low
inflation economies, where prices and wages are more sticky and hence
devaluations have a better chance of changing relative prices.  The problem
with restricting our analysis to group A episodes is that it can be argued
that we were are only evaluating successful episodes.  Countries did not have
to devalue agair precisely because the initial devaluation was successful.
The broader sample, group B, allows to answer the following question:
what happen to the real exchange rate if we consider countries that did not
devalue during the three years prior to time T, but that either maintained a
2  The real exchange rate is defined as EP  /P, where E, the nominal exchai,ge
rate is in local currency per US dollar. A depreciation is represented by an
increase and an appreciation by a decrease in the real exchange rate.10
fixed exchange rate or had one or more dev;.luations  (or  shifted to a crawling
pet) within the period T, T+3.  The outcomes of this exercise are shown in
table 2.b.  While the means and medians are slightly larger, the results are
not significantly differently (neither  statistically or quantitatively).  The
main difference, as exuected, is that countries that followed more aggressive
exchange rate policies  (i.e.  devalued more often) were able to effect larger
real depreciations.
TABLE  2
The Real Exchange Rate
a. Group A
Statistic  Level  Level  Level  Level  Difference  Difference
T-3  T-1  T  T+3  (%)  (%)
______________  ______  _  ________  __  _  _(T+3,T-3)  (T+3,T-1)
Mean  87.08  81.72  107.23  104.98  24.68  32.11
Median  83.50  70.25  101.44  96.8  14.68  24.70
T-Statistic  _  _  5.C2*  6.34*
b. Group B
Statistic  Level  Level  Leve  Level  Difference  Difference
T-3  T-i  T  T+3  (%)  (6)
l  _____________  ________  ________  (T+3,T-3)  (T+3,T-1)
Medn  89.51  85.82  112.33  116.02  31.90  36.80
Median  89.83  84.81  101.5  102.55  21.43  24.8.'
|  T-Statistic  --  --  --  --  5.53*  6.68*
*  Significant at the 5% level
**  Significant  at  the  10%  level
How much of the initial devaluation is eroded by increases in domestic
prices?  We address this issue by running a regression between the change in
the real exchange rate and the size of the nominal devaluation.  We first get
the estimates for episodes in group A.  For this group we calculate the
estimates for the entire sample, excluding the two outlying observations where
the nominal devaluation exceeded 200 percent.  The remaining 31 observations1.
were split into two sub-samples, depending on whether the devaluation was





Regressor  Sample 1  Sample 2  Sample 3
(all)  (  c= 50 )  ( >=  50 t)
Constant  -9.55  -3.93  -0.94
1  (-1.73)  (-0.39)  (-0.04)
Devaluation  0.73  0.52  0.65
(8.76)  (1.70)  (2.92)
R 2 0.72  0.52  0.65
DW  2.23  1.70  2.30
The results indicate that in countries where devaluations are an
infrequent event, around 60t  of the nominal devaluation is not eroded by




Regressor  Sample 1  Sample 2  Sample 3
_(all)  (  <= 50  t)  (  >=  50  t)
Constant  -3.88  47.78  -20.40
(-0.47)  (2.07)  1-1.1
Devaluation  0.72  -0.95  0.91
(5.72)  (-1.31)  (4.94)
R2  0.42  0.03  0.56
DW  1.20  1.40  1.26
We then extend the analysis for Group B, and found that while maxi-
devaluations  (in excess of 50M) continue to be effective, smaller devaluations
(between 20 and 50%) are now eroded by increases in domestic prices  (in  fact
the coefficient is negative, though not  statistically significant).  This12
indicates that, a priori, small devaluations are more likely to be eroded than
larg. ones.
3.b Inflation
A key question is whether devaluations lead to a permanent  increase in
inflation.  We address this issue examining the experiences of groups A and B.
This split of the sample is useful, with group A providing the "best" and
group B the "most likely" scenarios.
The results for group B (shown  in table 4.b) indicate that inflation is
likely to rise by about 3 percentage points  (from  8% at T-1 to 11% at T+3)
The increase is somewhat larger (3.5  percentage points) and statistically
significant if we compare T-3 to T+3.  What these results indicate is that if
we look at countries that have low inflation and have not devalued for three
years, a maxi-devaluation is not likely to move the economy into high
inflation.  In  most cases, inflation is going to increase around 3 percentage
points  (or 35t relative to the original rate of inflation).
The results for Group A are, not surprisi.agly,  more favorable regarding
inflation.  Table 4.a shows that the changes in inflation are small and not
statistically significant.  Based on the t-tests, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the change in inflation is zero over the period under
consideration.  In other words, the results obtained indicate that the
devaluation did not significantly change inflation in the longer term.
Nonetheless, we observe an increase in inflation in the year prior to
devaluation and, of course, in the year of the devaluation.  Inflation then





Statistic  Level  Level  Level  Level  Difference  Differernct
T-3  T-1  T  T+3  (%)  (%)
(T+3,T-3)  (T+3,T-1)
Mean  5.69  6.99  8.01  6.33  0.72  -0.62
Median  3.63  4.73  5.63  5.10  1.56  -0.43
T-Statistic  --  0.47  -0.35
b. Group B
Statistic  Level  Level  Level  Level  Difference  Difference 1
T-3  T-l  T  T+3  (%)  (%)
(T+3,T-3)  (T+3,T-1)
Mean  7.57  8.01  10.41  10.85  3.43  2.84
Median  5.85  6.28  8.36  6.44  2.67  0.57
T-Statistic  1  _  -. 71**  1.38
*  Significant at the 5% level
**  Significant  at the  10%  level
3.c Growth
The impact on GDP is similar to the one described Kamin's study and is
not very different for both groups  (see  tables 5)  .3  GDP typically falls prior
to the devaluation  (usually  the year before), and this is followed by a spurt
of growth in time T+1, which tapers off by T+3.  The mean exhibits a larger
increase than the median.  There is no statisticCl evidence that growth
increases in the longer term  (T+3)  relative to 3 years prior to the
devaluation.  Using t-tests, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
difference in the rate of growth is zero between time T+3 and T-l as well as
between T+3 and T-3.
3  Since the results are similar for both groups we only present those for
group B, the larger sample.  This is also the case for the comparisons that we
do later in this section  (e.g.  exports, international  reserves, etc.).14
TABLE 5
Rate of Growth of Real GDP
a. Group  A
Statistic  Level  Level  Level  Level  Difference  Difference
T-3  T-1  T  T+3  (T+3,T-3)  (T+3,T-1)
Mean  4.40  4.17  4.93  4.89  0.62  0.73
Median  5.13  5.10  4.40  5.08  0.71  0.70
T-Statistic  19  --  1.0  1.08
3.d Exports
We examine this issue by comparing the evolution of the ratio of exports
to GDP before and after the devaluation.  The results for group B are shown in
table 6.  We find that the ratio of exports to GDP, on average, falls prior to
the devaluation and then rises.  Exports, as a proportion to GDP  rise for both
time periods,  (T+3,T-3)  and  (T+3,T-1).  However, the null hypothesis that the
change in exports is zero cannot be rejected for the time period (T+3,T-3).
From the t-statistic obtained, the hypothesis that the increase in exports to
GDP is zero for the period  (T+3,T-l)  cannot be accepted at the 10 percent
level of significance.  Thus, there is only weak support for the craditional
view that devaluations have a favorable impact on exports.  The empirical
evidence provides no support for the possibility of perverse contractionary
effects of devaluation on exports.
TABLE 6
Exports  to GDP
Statistic  Level  Level  Level  Level  Difference  Difference
_  T-3  T-1  T  T+3  (T+3,T-3)  (T+3,T-1)
Mean  16.18  15.43  16.39  17.41  1.23  1.98
Median  14.30  14.13  13.53  16.  95  1.20  1.68
T-Statistic  1.75**  3.20*
3.e International Reserves15
We use the ratio of non-gold reserves to imports to study the impact on
the balance of payments for group B (the results are very similar for A).  The
results shown in table 7 indicate that the ratio of reserves to imports
decline prior to the devaluation, reaching its lowest level in the year
immediately preceding the devaluation.  This ratio rises after the
devaluation.  By T+3, the ratio of reserves to imports is higner, or average,
than it was at time T-3. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
difference  in the value of the indicator is zero for the rime period between
T+3 and T-3.  The t-test indicates clearly that there is a significant
improvement in the reserve position uf the devaluing countries by time T+3,
relative to time T-1. The data seems to indicate that the maxi-devaluation
followed a balance of payments crisis, as reserves fall beyond some minimum
acceptable level.
TABLE  7
Reserves  to Imports
Statistic  Level  Level  Level  Level  Difference  Difference
T-3  T-i  T  T+3  (T+3,T-3)  (T,3,T-1)
Mean  26.36  21.12  25.5  29.84  3.99  8.72
Median  19.89  15.26  17.  51  25.39  7.75  9.39
T-Statistic  -- J  1.04  310*
3.f Parallel Exchanae Rate
The data on reserves suggests that devaluations were effected to deal
with balance of payments crisis.  This appears to be confirmed by those
episodes for which data on the parallel exchange rate is available.  At times
of balance of payments crisis the premium on the parallel exchange rate tends
to rise in anticipation of a devaluation.  In table 8 we show the evolution of
the premium on the parallel exchange rate  (usually illegal) around the period
of the devaluation.  There is a sharp increase in the parallel premium prior
to the devaluation.  The premium reaches its peak in the year immediately16
preceding the devaluation, and there is a sharp decline after it, which
persists till time T+3.  The null hypothesis that the change in the parallel
premium is zero could not be accepted, using the t-test. F'or  this sample,
then, the devaluation was successful in dramatically reducing the size of the
parallel premium and maintaining it at the new lower level.  This seems to
indicate that a large part of the misalignment in the official rate was
ccrrected by the devaluation.
TABLE  8
The Parallel Premium
Statistic  Level  Level  Level  Level  Difference  Difference I  _  __  T-3  T-1  T  T+3  (T+3,T-3)  (T+3,T-1)
Mean  46.76  74.71  27.17  23.20  -24.09  -52.02
Median  3  3.,16  _52.6  7  118.18  16.94  -8.4  8  1-3  7  .02
T-Statistic  _  _  -3.40*  -3.72*-
III. ABANDONMENT OF THE FIXED EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEM
Most of the countries in our sample eventually moved out of the fixed
exchange rate system, and in most cases they adopted some form of crawling
peg.  Only Syria and Trinidad and Tobago are still under a fixed exchange
rate.  Table 9 provides basic information on timing and characteristics of the
movement to exchange rate fiexibility.  There is a first group of countries
that shifted between 1973 and 1976, at the time of the oil shocks.  This
coincides with the end of the Bretton Woods era, and the wider acceptance of
greater flexibility on exchange rate management among economists and policy
makers.  The second shift came in the early eighties, mainly in response to
the debt crisis.
Colombia and Egypt are two outliers within this group.  Colombia was the
first country to move to a crawling (in 1967), largely as a way to avoid the17
recurrent cycles in the real exchange rate resulting from rates of inflation
that while low, were higher that international levels.  Egypt is a late comer
to the shift in exchange rate regime, because adjustment was undertaken at a
later stage.
In most countries the shift to a more flexible exchange rate regime was
accompanied by a maxi-devaluation  (usually  within a year of the change).  As
can be noticed from the third column in table 9, the largest one was in Costa
Rica  (320  percent), though in most cases the devaluations were much smaller.
Only six countries shifted to a crawling peg withc Ft  an initial devaluation.
Was the shift in exchange rate regime was associated with an increase in
inflation?  After all, the fixec±  exchange rate served as an anchor for
domestic prices and contributed to the maintenance of fiscal prudence and
overall macroeconomic stability.  The last three columns show the average
inflation rate for the three years prior to the devaluation, and three years
after.
In most cases inflation went up, and in a few instances the increases
were dramatic  (e.g.  Israel, Zaire, Mexico, and Ecuador).  However, the
evidence does not indicate that the movement to greater exchange rate
flexibility was associated with complete loss of control of inflation.  In
Pakistan and Rwanda inflation in fact fell, while in most countries it
remained on average below 20 percent.
Table t0.a shows average indicators of policy and performance before and
af_er the change of exchange rate system for the full sample.  The change of
exchange rate regime was effective in achieving a real depreciation  (of
approximately 16E), both in the medium and long term.  Inflation on average
increased from 12% before the devaluation to 24% after, and hence remained at
moderate levels.  in most cases inflation remained in moderate range even the18
longer term.  The average ir.flation  in these episodes for a period comprising
ten years after the devaluation was 26%, with a median of 16%.
It is useful to examine the longer term impact  of the change of regime.
For this purpose we divide the sample and examine separately  he poor
performers, e.g. those countries that combined relatively high inflation rates
(above  20 percent or higher) and low growth,  from the good performers.  There
were eight countries in the poor performance group, the rest being the good
performers.  The basic data for each of these groups is presented in tables
10.b and 10.c.
In both groups, the change in exchange rate regime was associated with a
depreciation of the real exchange rate.  On average, the real depreciation was
greater for the "poor" performance countries.  Inflation, on average was
higher after the change of regime for all countries.  It should be pointed out
that those countries that lost macroeconomic stability had higher rates of
inflations prior to the change of regime.  Countries that had inflation below
10% did not lose control over inflation.
Growth was clearly higher in the countries that managed to maintain
lower rates of inflations.  The size of the budget deficits did  not increase
significantly after the change of regime in neither group  (in  fact in most
cases they fell), although the magnitudes appear to be high.  This indicates
hat the change of exchange rate probably motivated by underlying large
eficits.  However, once the deficits were reduced inflation did not come down
(perhaps  because it was accommodated by exchange rate policy).
Finally, external indicators convey a mixed message.  The resource
balance improved for the group as a whole, though the improvement was bigger
A the "poor" performance countries  (perhaps  because of the real depreciation
was larger and andertook a larger fiscal adjustment).  The average exports to19
GDP ratio exhibits virtually no change for the entire sample, though the
"poor" performers did better in this area.
IV. FINAL REMARKS
Figure 2 provides a useful summary of the main findings of this paper.
This figure summarizes and compares Kamin's results, which based on a larger
sample of devaluations, to ours, which concentrates on low inflation
economies.  There is a clear contrast regarding the effectiveness of
devaluations to afLect the real exchange rate, with our results pro;iding much
more room for devaluation optimism in low inflation economies with a tradition
of a fixed exchange rate.  The outcome on inflation is also more positive for
the low inflation economies, as we do not observe any significant increase in
inflation.  Finally, both studies find the devaluations have a favorable
impact on growth, although the outcome is more lasting i.n  countries that
manage to maintain low inflation.Figure  2
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TABLE  9
Features  of the Change  in Exchange  Rate  Regime
Country  Year  of CERR  CERR  with  maxi-  Average  Average
devaluation  Inflat'.on  Inflation
(size of maxi-  before  CERR  after  CERR
devaluation)  (%)  (%)
Argentina  1955  Yes  (158.23%)  15.50  23.24
Colombia  1967  No  13.67  7.61
India  1972  No  2.92  17.09
Israel  1974  Yes  (42.86%)  14.96  35.11
Finland  1975  No  11.60  11.61
Greece  1975  No  15.58  12.67
Peru  1975  Yes  (54.16W)  11.20  43.13
Sri  Lanka  1975  Yes  (76.26%)  9.43  4.90
Zaire  19 6  Yes  (72.18%)  24.59  72.92
Iran  1980  No  16.50  20.88
Costa  Rica  1981  Yes  (321.12%)  11.11  44.90
Mexico  1981  Yes  (267.843%)  20.67  75.41
Nepal  1981  No  8.53  8.97
Philippines  1981  Yes  (52.68%)  14.36  23.53
Tunisia  1981  Yes  (23.16%)  7.70  10.36
Ecuador  1982  Yes  (32.60%)  13.25  _5.88
Pakistan  1982  Yes  '29.70%)  10.70  6.07
Burundi  1983  Yes  (30.46%)  6.76  6.63  -
Jamaica  1983  Yes  (84.00%)  15.53  22.86
Rwanda  1983  No  8.75  2.02
Venezuela  1984  Yes  (74.42%)  10.69  17.02
Egypt  19  a189  Yes  (57.1.4%)  20.41  16.76
Egypt~~~~  ~  ~  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ___  _  __  _  _  _  _
Notes:
Average  inflation  figures  are  the mean  inflation  for  three  years  before  and
after  the  year  od  the  change  of the exchange  rate  regime.  Inflation  is based
on  the  CPI  (from  the  IFS).21
Table  10.a
Change  of  Exchange  Rate  Regime  (CERR)
Full  Sample
Indicator  Statistic  |Level  before  Level  three  Change  in
CERR  years  after  indicator
_______________  - ________________  j~  -_______  __  C  E  R  R  _
RER  Mean  95.81  112.48  17.76
|______________  Median  97.85  103.49  5.  76 
Inflation  (%)  Mean  1.2.  93  23.62  10.69
Median  12 43  _  17.06  4  4.63
Maximum  24.59  75.41
______________  Minimun,  2.92  2.02
Real  GDP  Mean  3.90  2.88  -1.02
(t  rate  of
lrowth)  Median  4.35  2.68  -1.67 
Maximum  9.41  10.86  ..  |
Mir.imum  -5.98  -1.39  ..  |
Fiscal  Mean  5.11  5.01  0.69
Deficit/GDP
(%)  Median  3.19  4.81  2.27
Maximuim  17.  47  17.52
___  _  _  ___  _  Minimum  -'.64  -1.08
Exports/GDP  Mean  -6.13  16.51  8.38
(real,  %)
_______________  Median  13.41  14.85  1.44 _-
Resource  rMean  -5.90  -4.45  L.46
Balance/GDP
(%, real)  Median  -5.42  -4.17  __1.25_  _
Notes:
Level  of  indicator  os  the average  for  three  years  before  an  after  the  change
in the  exchange  rate  regime.
Change  in the  indicator  is the difference  between  the  average  value  of the
indicator  three  years  before  and  after  the  CERR.22
TABLE  lO.b
Change  of Exchange  Rate  Regime  (CERR)
Cases  of Macroeconowic  Collapse
Indicator  etatistic  Before  CERR  After  CERR  After  CERR
(Incl..  Year  (Excl.  Year
of CERR)  of  CERR)
RER  flean  95.91  117.19  120.71
Media-  93.15  123.53  127.83
Inflation  (%)  Mean  15.64  51.64  53.65
Median  14.10  47.99  48.25
Maximum  24.59  105.59  112.18
Minimum  iO.69  18.54  16.76
Real  GDP  (t rog)  Mean  4  49  1.82  1.73
Median  4.36  1.93  1.67
Maximum  9.41  3.71  3.40
Minimum  -1.75  0.16  -0.62
Fis.Def/GDP  (k)  Mean  8.24  7.54  7.13
Median  5.  Y2  4.  78  4.26
Maximum  22.05  17.79  _  17.36
Minimum  0.62  1.29  1.56
Exports/GDP  (  IAean  15.90  19.79  18.93
Median  19.b4  20.89  21.20
Res.Bal/GDP  (  Mean  -5.11  -1.82  -1.24
Median  -1.84  0.22  0.41
Notes:
Before  CERR:  Statistic  calculated  using  indicator  va.ues  for  three  years
preceding  the  year  of change  of the  exchange  rate  regime.
After  CERR:  Statistic  calculated  using  indicator  va.ues  for  ten years  or  till
last  period  for  which  data  are  available  (whichever  is shorter)  following  the
year  of  change  of  the  exchange  rate  regime.
Incl.  Year  o~f  CERR:  Statistic  calculated  including  the  value  of  the  indicator
for  the  year  of  the  change  in the  exchange  rate  regime.
Excl,  Year  of  CERR:  Statistic  calculated  excluding  the  value  of the  indicator
for  the  year  of the  change  in the  exchange  rate  regime.23
TABLE  l0.c
Change  of Exchange  Rate  Regime  (CERR)
Non-Collapse  Cases
Indicator  Statistic  Before  CERR  After  CERR  After  CERR
(Incl.  Year  (Excl.  Year
of CERR)  of  CERR)
RER  Mean  93.86  103.72  104.78
Median  97.94  107.68  108.45
Inflation  (e)  Niean  9.84  11.71  11.79
Median  8.75  10.61  10.77
Maximum  16.50  19.54  19.40
Minimum  2.92  3.28  2.62
Real  GDP  (%  rog)  Mean  3.80  3.51  3.53
Median  4.52  3.56  3.98
Maximum  7.30  6.20  6.16
Minimum  -5.98  0.48  -0.31
Fis.Def/GDP  :W  Mean  4.74  5.69  5.57
Median  2.90  5.18  5.43
Maximum  15.74  11.20  11.15
Minimum  0.93  0.72  0.76
Exports/GDP  (  Mean  16.74  15.81  15.73
Median  12.68  12.64  11.54
Res.Bal/GDP  (t)  Mean  -4.82  -4.59  -4.61
Median  -5.42  -6.37  -6.46
Notes:
Before  CERR:  Statistic  calculated  using  indicator  values  for  three  years
preceding  the year  of  change  of the  exchange  rate  regime.
After  CERR:  Statistic  calculated  using  indicator  values  for  ten  years  or  till
last  period  for which  data  are  available  (whichever  is shorter)  following  the
year  of  change  of the  exchange  rate  regime.
Incl.  Year  of CERR:  Statistic  calculated  including  the value  of  the  indicator
for  the  year  of  the change  in the  exchange  rate  regime.
Excl.  Year  of CERR:  Statistic  calculated  excluding  the value  of  the  indicator
for  the  year  of the  change  in the  exchange  rate  regime.24
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